

# Deanonymisation in Ethereum Using Existing Methods for Bitcoin

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RP1 #61

06-02-2018

# Introduction

- Blockchain
  - Decentralised
  - Peer-to-peer
  - Miners
  - Anonymous reputation
- Forensics
  - Track malicious actors



# Introduction

## The integrity of the *blockchain*





Figure 1: Overview of how blocks in a blockchain are linked to each other

# Introduction

## Blockchain popularity

- Bitcoin
  - 2009
  - 'Satoshi Nakamoto'
- Ethereum
  - 2015
  - Vitalik Buterin



# Research Question


"Is deanonymisation of clients feasible  
for the Ethereum network?"



# Related Work

- Survey on Bitcoin security and privacy issues
  - Essential background knowledge
  - Attacks on Bitcoin
    - Bitloline
- Survey on Ethereum smart contracts
  - Aimed at illegitimately obtaining funds
  - DAO attack


# Bitcoin



# Bitcoin P2P Network

## Discovering clients:

- Hardcoded seed servers
- Clients maintain 8 entry-nodes
- `getaddr` message



## Transaction propagation:

- Trickleing
  - Queueing `inv` messages
  - 100ms




# Bitcoin Blockchain

## Transactions

- Based on UTXO
- Use up all inputs
- Change

## Blocks:


- Merkle tree
- Header hash
- Forks



# Bitcoin (& Ethereum) Consensus Model

PoW (Proof of Work):

- Based on computational power
- Against Sybil attack




# Ethereum




# Ethereum Smart Contracts

- Code written for EVM
  - Turing complete
  - Solidity
- Immutable once deployed
- Miners paid in gas - prevent DoS
- Crowd funding



# Ethereum P2P Network

- Kademlia based
- Bootnodes
- Find nodes
  - `nodeID` from public key
  - Closeness
  - XOR of SHA-3 hash




# Ethereum Blockchain

## Transactions:

- No UTXO
- Account balance

## Blocks:

- Global state
- Transaction *trie*
- Ommers



# Attacks



# Existing Attacks - Finding IP Addresses




Figure 2: Entry-nodes in Bitcoin

- Identifying entry-nodes
  - Monitor 'server' nodes
  - Listen for `addr` messages
- Monitor network
- Transaction broadcasts
- Very resource intensive




# Effectiveness - Finding IP Addresses

- Peers of a node more volatile
- No set number of peers




# Existing Attacks - Clustering

- Crawler
- Multi-input transactions
- Transaction 'change'



# Effectiveness - Clustering

- No multi input
- No change
- No shadow addresses



# Discussion & Conclusion

*"Is deanonymisation of clients feasible  
for the Ethereum network?"*

Deanonymisation attacks difficult to apply:

- Finding IP
  - Nodes not static
- Clustering
  - No multiple addresses

But, possibilities for similar attacks

# Future Work

- **Bootnodes**
  - Shadow network
  - Government
- **Peer selection protocol**
  - Create nodes
  - Identify nodes
- **Attack wallet software**
  - Less resource intensive

# References

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# Questions

